Part 1 of Iranian Breakout Time Misperceptions:
I have posts many links to articles dealing with the efforts of major nuclear powers to negotiate regulation of Iran's nuclear program. The exact details of the negotiations have been kept secret so I have not posted my own comments on these efforts. The Prime Minister of Israel just gave a speech to the U.S. Congress about the dangers of a Iranian nuclear weapons program. The PM has been accusing Iran of developing nuclear weapons for years but even the Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service disagrees with his arguments that Iran is on the verge of creating nuclear weapons. Today I am going to post the first of two articles reviewing some misperceptions about the Iranian nuclear program.
One of the big arguments between the U.S. and Israel with respect to the Iranian nuclear program is the fact that some of the technology being discussed could, in theory, be repurposed to the creation of nuclear weapons. The U.S. is willing to allow Iran to keep their uranium enrichment equipment as long as there is a strict international program for inspecting Iran's nuclear facilities. The PM of Israel has said that it is unacceptable for Iran to even have the technology that could be used to enrich uranium to weapons grade. One of the key measures that the U.S. Congress will be using to weigh any agreement with Iran will be something called the "breakout time" which is defined as the minimum time Iran would need to create fifty five pounds of weapons grade uranium. This is the amount of fissile material needed to create a single atomic bomb. Critics of this criterion say that the breakout time is a misleading and inadequate criterion for judging agreements with Iran for the following reasons.
1. Proponents of the breakout time criterion say that it is a good indicator of the time that would be required to build an nuclear bomb. Obtaining fifty five pounds of weapons grade uranium would only be the first step. Converting the enriched uranium fluoride gas into a powder, turning the power into a metallic core, surrounding the core with explosives and integrating the whole assembly into a miniaturized warhead would then follow. It is estimated that it might take from six months to eighteen months for this additional processing. Then the bomb would need to be tested.
2. Proponents of the breakout time criterion say that it can be measured accurately. Actually, only estimates are possible and they can vary widely depending on some underlying assumptions with respect to centrifuge efficiency, chemical conversion of uranium to feed the centrifuges, setting up centrifuge cascades and recycling waste. Often breakout time estimates are also assuming that Iran has none of the technical problems that have plagued its nuclear program in the past. Realistically, Iran would need two bomb to start in order to test one. This doubles breakout estimates. Simply proving that it could make a bomb would not serve as a nuclear deterrent. Even a small arsenal would multiply the breakout time again.
(Continued in Part Two tomorrow)
Iranian nuclear sites:
