Nuclear Weapons 125 - Breakout Time Is Not A Valid Criterion For Judging Iranian Nuclear Weapons Potential - Part 2

Nuclear Weapons 125 - Breakout Time Is Not A Valid Criterion For Judging Iranian Nuclear Weapons Potential - Part 2

Part 2 of Iranian Breakout Time Misperceptions (Please read Part 1 first):

3. Proponents of the breakout time criterion claim that this process is the most likely way that Iran would create nuclear weapons at known Iranian nuclear facilities. This is contradicted by the fact that other nations such as Libya, Syria, Iraq, Romania and North Korea have all built clandestine sites to secretly work towards nuclear weapons. Two of Iran's nuclear facilities had been secret until uncovered by U.S. intelligence. If Iran does decide to work on creating a nuclear arsenal, it is most likely that it will be at secret sites that would not be open to inspection. This could be called "sneakout" as opposed to "breakout."

4. Proponents of the breakout time criterion claim that the shorter the estimated breakout time, the more the U.S.'s ability to prevent an Iran bomb is reduced. The truth is that any detection by current inspections of weapons grade uranium at any Iranian nuclear facility would trigger alarms that would result in immediate attention by the U.S. and other countries involved in the negotiations with Iran. Contingency plans for military intervention could be drafted and implemented in days which means that estimates of breakout in months are not the determining factors for a response.

5.  Proponents of the breakout time criterion claim that the shorter the estimated breakout time, the more likely it is that Iran will attempt it. On the other hand, Iran has had an estimated breakout time of a few months for four years and they have not made an attempt to build a bomb yet. Currently Iran is negotiating for monitoring and inspections that would expand the estimated breakout time to a year. U.S intelligence says that Iran has had the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons since 2007 but has not chosen to do so.

         Breakout time is a simple way of assessing nuclear weapons activity but it is not sufficient to really answer the question of how long it would take a particular nation to actually design, build, test and manufacture an nuclear arsenal that could serve as a real deterrent to hostile neighbors. Iran's leaders are very shrewd at negotiating. They are balancing external threats against international sanctions. They are working hard to drive the best bargain that they can.

         Some factions in the U.S. Congress have advocated an attack on Iran for years. Israel has hinted that if the U.S. does not participate in military action against Iran soon, Israel will unilaterally attack Iranian nuclear sites. This would be a very dangerous move for Israel and could destabilize the Middle East even further. Negotiations are rapidly approaching a deadline for a nuclear deal with Iran. Negotiators are afraid that the hawks in the U.S. Congress will ram through legislation that would impose much harsher sanctions on Iran if a deal cannot be finalized by the deadline. Critics say that this action by the U.S. could make future negotiations much more difficult.

Iranian nuclear facilities: