I have been blogging lately about concerns that terrorists may have been targeting the nuclear power plants in Belgium. There has been speculation that they were planning an attack but that they changed targets because the authorities were rounding up members of their network in the aftermath of the Paris attack last November. People who worked at nuclear power plants have left and gone to Syria to join ISIS. There are terrorist surveillance tapes of an official at a nuclear isotope production facility in Belgium. A security guard has been killed and his key card was taken. There have been reported attempts by ISIS and Al Qaeda to buy nuclear materials in Moldavia which has become a center for the smuggling of nuclear materials.
The first concern is that terrorist could infiltrate or attack a nuclear power plant with the intention of causing major damage that would result in the release of radioactive materials into the environment. This would require specialized knowledge of the security and the technology of a nuclear power plant. The nuclear official under surveillance, the murdered security guard or the Belgian nuclear workers that joined ISIS could have potentially supplied the needed expertise for an attack on a Belgian power plant. The Fukushima nuclear disaster is an example of the havoc that can be wrought by a major accident at a nuclear power plant. There are over four hundred operational nuclear power plants around the world that could make tempting targets for terrorists.
Another big concern is the possibility of terrorists getting their hands on radioactive materials that could be combined with conventional explosives to create what is called a "dirty" bomb. The dispersal of radioactive materials over a wide area by a dirty bomb would poison people living there and be very hard to clean up. The disruption and cost would be great. The Belgian government sent armed troops to the four Belgian nuclear power plants before the recent attack on the airport and subway in Brussels. However, there are many other places where terrorists could obtain nuclear materials for a dirty bomb. Research reactors, hospitals, construction sites, and other places make use of radioactive materials for a variety of purposes. None of these enjoy the same level of security as a nuclear power plant. It is estimated that there are tens of thousands of radiological sources located in more than 100 countries around the world that could provide terrorists with materials to make a dirty bomb. In 2013 and 2014 alone, there were three hundred and twenty five reported incidents of radioactive materials being lost or stolen or improperly secured in some way.
The possibility of terrorists getting their hands on an actual nuclear bomb is the most frightening of terrorist nuclear scenarios. First of all, it is very difficult to enrich uranium to weapons grade. Huge production facilities are required. So that makes it unlikely that terrorists could actually produce the highly enriched uranium (HEU) needed for a bomb. So the next question is how difficult it would it be for terrorist to steal or purchase the HEU they would need? There are large quantities of HEU in stockpiles around the world with varying degrees of security. The International Atomic Energy Agency has reported that between 1993 and 2014 there were thirteen reported case of the “illegal possession, sale, or movement" of HEU. All of these incidents involved less than two pounds of HEU which is far less than the amount needed to make a bomb. As I mentioned above, there is a traffic in nuclear materials in such places as Moldavia and it is unknown whether or not there have been successful transactions involving substantial amounts of HEU. Even with the possession of enough HEU, the construction of a working nuclear bomb is not simple and requires expertise, equipment and facilities. While this possibility is remote, it is not impossible and there are terrorist organizations who wish to accomplish it.
Simple nuclear bomb design:
