The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant is located near Carlsbad, New Mexico. It was completed fifteen years ago and dedicated to the permanent geological disposal of radioactive wastes association with the manufacture of U.S. nuclear weapons. In February of 2014, a drum of waste exploded and twenty workers were exposed to a small amount of radiation. The filtration system failed to contain the radioactive particles from the drum and they escaped from the WIPP facility. Some were detected twenty miles away near Carlsbad.
The drum that exploded had been shipped from Los Alamos National Laboratory. It was determined that the drum of waste had been treated with a new absorbent material to solidify the waste. The new absorbent had combined with some of the materials in the waste and created an explosive compound that ultimately destroyed the drum. Hundreds of barrels from LANL contained the new absorbent. Some had been shipped to WIPP, some went to a nuclear storage facility in Texas and some remain at LANL. Any of these drums may explode. The facility was shut down in order to complete analysis of the accident and to effect repairs. There were plans to reopen the facility in March of 2016.
It has just been announced that the planned reopening of WIPP has now be postponed because of "unanticipated challenges." A new date for reopening the facility has not been given. Dana Bryson, acting manager for the Department of Energy's Carlsbad Field Office, said in a statement on Friday: "We are disappointed that we will not meet the original target date for beginning waste emplacement." A press release from the U.S. Department of Energy also said that "While the WIPP recovery program continues to make significant progress, the original target date of March 2016 for resuming waste emplacement operations is no longer viable due to a variety of unanticipated issues." Some of the issues that need to be resolved include heightened DoE safety standards and problems with the ventilation system.
There are multiple reasons for this accident and they should not have been "unanticipated." The new absorbent at LANL was used after a technician warned that someone should check on the chemistry of the new absorbent for possible problems. The records for the contents of the drums were incomplete or non-existent. The chamber where the drum exploded should have been sealed because it had been filled. The sealing of chambers was mandated by the official procedures to be thick plugs of concrete and steel. Sometime after the facility had opened, the plugs were abandoned and thin steel doors were used. Then even the use of the steel doors stopped.
If the procedures at LANL and WIPP had been properly followed, there were a number of occurrences which should have raised red flags and been addressed. Had adherence to regulations been monitored and enforced properly, this accident would never have happened. They need to repair the ventilation system and seal the chamber properly but they don't just need new safety regulations. They need to make sure they follow safety regulations that are already in place.
