Part 2 of 2 Parts (Please read Part 1 first)
     The Princeton researchers, using archived weather data over a forty-eight-hour period across a number of dates in 2021 to simulate the expected radioactive plume, discovered that the West Coast states were at the lowest risk due to a prevailing easterly wind.
     However, depending on the exact wind direction, the worst fallout could rain down over any part of the U.S. and Canada east of Idaho. Based on weather patterns on December 2, 2021, Chicago, Illinois and Washington D.C., among other population centers, would be in the direct path of a fatal dose of radiation.
     In a worst-case scenario, almost all of Montana and North Dakota, as well as parts of Nebraska, Colorado, Wyoming, South Dakota and Kansas would receive a dose of radiation more than ten times what is considered lethal, bringing death in a few days. Most of the Midwestern U.S., would receive a lethal dose of radiation, while elsewhere would see deaths occur in weeks.
     The researchers found that most people living in North America would have a one percent chance of receiving an outdoor dose severe enough to cause acute radiation poisoning resulting in death.
     The Princeton modeling makes its prediction based on the assumption that all silo-based missiles would be struck. The report does note that its projections have already been confirmed by a 1990 Federal Emergency Management Agency assessment. It found that no part of the U.S. was beyond the risk of deadly levels of radiation.
     Laura Helmuth is the Scientific American’s editor-in-chief. She said, “These maps send a clear message with which the many nuclear safety and environmental experts we spoke to concur: these are not risks that we should be taking.”
     The Pentagon stressed the need for the U.S. to have a functioning atomic arsenal to act as a deterrent against other nations with nuclear arsenals. Some critics have questioned the cost and necessity of the new missile replacement program because of the occasional false alarms in the system and the advances in U.S. submarines and aerial strike capabilities.
      William J. Perry, former U.S. Secretary of Defense, stated his opinion in 2016 that “there is only one way to win an arms race: refuse to run.” He added that “The only real way to use nuclear weapons is never. They should exist only in numbers large enough to deter their use by others, which they already abundantly do, with not one warhead more.” His opinion was cited in the Scientific American article.
     A DoD spokesperson claimed that the “the attributes of each Triad leg are complementary, ensuring that the United States can withstand and respond to any strategic attack.”
     He added that “After extensive review, the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review reiterated that the combination of all three legs of the U.S. nuclear Triad is the best approach to maintaining strategic stability at reasonable cost while mitigating against the risk of potential technical, programmatic or other problems or vulnerabilities. Silo-based ICBMs have been a core element of the Triad for over 60 years, and the replacement of the Minuteman III ICBM weapon system by the Sentinel ICBM weapon system does not increase risk to the United States.”

Ambient office = 104 nanosieverts per hour

Ambient outside = 159 nanosieverts per hour

Soil exposed to rain water = 158 nanosieverts per hour

Green grape from Central Market = 109 nanosieverts per hour

Tap water = 89 nanosieverts per hour

Filter water = 80 nanosieverts per hour

Part 1 of 2 Parts
     It is estimated that a nuclear strike on U.S. cities would be devastating. However, a nuclear attack on U.S. missile silos would kill millions by acute radiation poisoning in a few days. Radioactive fallout would spread across the entire country.
     A recent study published in Scientific American concluded that if the strategic missile launch bases were hit, most of the Midwest would be bathed in a more than legal dose of radiation. In a worst-case scenario, most of the U.S. and Canada would become uninhabitable.
    Researchers at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security estimated that in the first four days after the missile silos were struck, between three hundred forty thousand and four and a half million people would die. The average death toll would be around one and a half million. The report they produced predicted that three hundred million people would be at risk of a lethal dose of fallout.
     The Princeton study follows a statement by the U.S. Air Force last year that said that it would be replacing all of its Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). These missiles have been in operation since the 1970s. There are also more modern Sentinel missiles from 2009.
     It is estimated that the one and a half trillion-dollar plan will replace all four hundred of the older missiles. Though the range and payload of the Sentinel ICBM have not been officially released, they are believed to have an equivalent explosive power of eight hundred kilotons of TNT. When fired, they are expected to travel up to six thousand miles and strike any target around the world in thirty minutes.
     Minuteman missiles have a range of eight thousand miles. They carry estimated payloads equivalent to one hundred seventy to three hundred fifty-five kilotons.
     The researchers at Princeton said that the U.S. Air Force had investigated the potential effects on humans and the environment of deploying a Sentinel. However, they did not mention what would happen if the missiles were detonated in their silos.
     A Department of Defense (DoD) spokesperson told Newsweek that it had not had the opportunity to review the Princeton report so they could not directly address its findings. However, they did say that the Sentinel missiles would not increases the risk to the U.S.
     The DoD said, “The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review made clear that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. To this end, the best deterrent to adversary initiation of nuclear war against the United States or its allies or partners is a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent and strong and credible extended deterrence.”
     U.S. nuclear missiles silo bases are located across five states including Colorado, Wyoming, Nebraska, Montana and North Dakota. They form part of the U.S. “nuclear triad, which gives the U.S. the ability to also launch nuclear strikes from submarines and aircraft if one leg of the triad is compromised.
     The researchers said that the nuclear missiles in their silos are buried deep underground and covered with a huge blast door. In order to detonate one of those missiles, an enemy nuclear warhead would have to land very close to the silo.
Please read Part 2 next

Ambient office = 89 nanosieverts per hour

Ambient outside = 92 nanosieverts per hour

Soil exposed to rain water = 94 nanosieverts per hour

Blueberry from Central Market = 104 nanosieverts per hour

Tap water = 127 nanosieverts per hour

Filter water = 117 nanosieverts per hour

     An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts has just finished a follow-up nuclear security advisory mission to Switzerland. The International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission drew the conclusion that Switzerland has improved its nuclear security regime since an IPPAS mission in 2018.
     IPPAS missions are intended to help IAEA member states to strengthen their national nuclear security regimes. These missions provide advice from nuclear energy producing peers in implementing international instruments and IAEA guidance on the protection of nuclear and other radioactive materials and facilities. These missions can be conducted on both a nationwide and facility-specific basis.
     The latest mission was conducted from the 30th of October to the 10th of November of this year. It was carried out at the request of the Swiss government and hosted by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI), the Swiss Federal Office of Energy (SFOE) and the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH).
     The twelve-day mission completes the cycle of activities initiated by the IPPAS mission covering all five modules of the IPPAS program. These include a review of the security of radioactive materials, associated facilities and associated activities, and nuclear facilities, nuclear materials transport, and information and computer security.
     The review team was led by Pedro Lardiez Holgado, who is the Head of the Nuclear Security Division of Spain’s Nuclear Safety Council. The team included eight experts from Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, Turkey, the UK, the USA and one IAEA staff member.
     The IAEA team identified significant progress in addressing the findings of the 2018 IPPAS mission. It also observed how the nuclear security regime has been enhanced in Switzerland since then. It was noted that Switzerland currently has a strong nuclear security regime. It is committed to continuous improvement in the security of nuclear and other radioactive materials.
     Arvydas Stadalnikas is the Head of the Integrated Nuclear Security Approaches Unit at the IAEA Division of Nuclear Security. He said, “The follow-up mission in Switzerland shows its commitment to nuclear security and its openness in receiving an external review of the national nuclear security regime. The inclusion of one additional module on the security of radioactive material underscores Switzerland’s integrated approach towards physical protection. The mission’s findings indicate a well-established national nuclear security regime and its alignment with the IAEA nuclear security guidance.”
     Marc Kenzelmann is the ENSI Director General. He said, “I would like to thank everyone involved in Switzerland for their great commitment to the extensive preparations and for their dedication during the two-week peer review. We are very grateful to the IPPAS team for their critical scrutiny of the security measures. The recommendations of the international experts are extremely important for ENSI, the Federal Office of Public Health, the Swiss Federal Office of Energy and for further partners in the nuclear security domain. We need to work together to systematically and consistently strengthen nuclear security in Switzerland.”
     Switzerland currently has four nuclear power reactors generating about thirty five percent of its electricity.

Ambient office = 97 nanosieverts per hour

Ambient outside = 63 nanosieverts per hour

Soil exposed to rain water = 66 nanosieverts per hour

Black grape from Central Market = 87 nanosieverts per hour

Tap water = 127 nanosieverts per hour

Filter water = 112 nanosieverts per hour

     The Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (ASN) is France’s `nuclear safety regulator. It has stated that it is prepared to provide Électricité de France S.A. (EDF) with more time so that they can implement safety upgrades required at its fleet of nine-hundred-megawatt nuclear power reactors.
     EDF is a French multinational electric utility company owned by the French state. Headquartered in Paris, with seventy eight billion dollars in revenues in 2016, EDF operates a diverse portfolio of at least 120 gigawatts of generation capacity in Europe, South America, North America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.
     EDF’s thirty-two nine-hundred-megawatt reactors were put into commercial operation between 1977 and 1988. They include the oldest operational nuclear reactor in France. Such nine-hundred-megawatt reactors are currently in operation at EDF’s Blayais, Bugey, Chinon, Cruas-Meysse, Dampierre, Gravelines, Saint-Laurent and Tricastin plants.
     ASN reviews operations at all French reactors every ten years. These reviews are conducted in two steps. First, the ‘generic’ review phase which covers subjects common to the design of all nine-hundred-megawatt reactors. Second, the ‘specific” review phase which deals with each reactor individually. The current review series will end in 2031.
      In February 2021, ASN established the conditions for the continued operations of EDF’s reactors beyond forty years. This completed the ‘generic’ phase of the review series. ASN said that it considered the measures planned by the EDF combined with those mandated by the ASN would ensure the safety of all such reactors for a further ten years of operation.
     The measures required verifying the conformity of the reactors with their reference system as well as improving their ability to withstand more severe attacks “of internal or external origin.” Modifications will also limit the radiological consequences of accidents or attacks which do not result in a core meltdown. In addition, improvements will be made in the arrangements for managing accidental or aggressive situations which impact the spent nuclear fuel storage at the reactors.
     So far, EDF has initiated or completed the fourth ten-year inspection of sixteen of its reactors. The majority of safety improvements have been implemented. In October of last year, EDF requested that ASN postpone deadlines for some of the requirements of this decision, “given the difficulties of being able to meet them.” EDF said that these difficulties included the following problems. The possibility of the occurrence of technical hazards during the implementation of certain requirements. Issues with making changes in the scheduling of outages for fuel renewal, linked in particular to the discovery of stress corrosion on auxiliary lines. There are possibilities of long-term accidental outages and tensions affecting the electrical network. And, finally, the concomitance of other periodic reviews causing strains on its engineering capabilities.
     ASN said, “The modifications requested by EDF also aim to standardize the deadlines between the reactors, in order to facilitate the industrial programming of the work, to limit the number of different configurations of the reactors and thus to facilitate the appropriation of safety improvements by the teams responsible for operations. Taking into account the difficulties presented by EDF and the justifications provided regarding the deadline extensions, ASN considers the request acceptable.”
     The application file presented by EDF and the ASN’s draft amending decision are now subject to a three-week public consultation.